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INTRODUCTION

In the determination of compensatory damages, is it proper for the court to
allow the jury to consider grossly inflated medical costs that the plaintiff never
actually incurred? Or rather, is the issue of whether to allow a defendant to
contest the "reasonableness" of the billed amount overshadowed by the question
of whether the billed amount is even an accurate indication of the value itself,
given that recent medical hyperinflation has excessively influenced the "list"
price of many health care providers? A growing number of jurisdictions across
the country are beginning to notice this alarming trend in the health care industry
and have taken action to counteract it.I Indeed, in light of recent medical pricing
inflation, coupled with the complexities of the health care and insurance

1.

See infra Part IV.

853
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reimbursement systems, the time has come for South Carolina to change its
current approach for determining compensatory damages.
In 2003, the South Carolina Supreme Court held in Haselden v. Davis that
evidence of the actual amount paid for health care services was admissible in
determining the "reasonable" value of medical damages.3
However, in
Covington v. George4-decided just fourteen months after Haselden the South
Carolina Supreme Court limited itself on this very issue.
Although the
Covington court never specifically overruled the Haselden decision, the court
approached the same issue differently. 6 The court determined that this issue
directly implicates the collateral source rule, holding that the actual payment
amount should be excluded as evidence on the issue of reasonableness of
medical expenses sought. Therefore, currently in South Carolina, a jury must
determine this "reasonable value" with no indication of the actual amount paid to
fully satisfy these same medical bills.
Part II of this Note discusses the history and application of the collateral
source rule in South Carolina and other jurisdictions. It then discusses the South
Carolina Supreme Court's holdings in Haselden and Covington with respect to
the application of the collateral source rule and the void created by the difference
between "paid" and "billed" amounts. Part III provides an in-depth analysis of
the Covington decision's harmful effects, particularly in light of the recent
hyperinflation of medical costs. Part IV analyzes the methodologies of other
jurisdictions that approach this issue differently through varying interpretations
of reasonableness, highlighting the flaws in the current medical pricing system,
discussing the varying applications of the law of damages, and considering
whether an injured plaintiff ever incurred the actual medical expenses. Finally,
Part V reiterates the need for change to South Carolina's current approach to this
problem and posits several potential solutions.

2.
353 S.C. 481, 579 S.E.2d 293 (2003).
3.
See id. at 484-85, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (quoting Kashner v. Geisinger Clinic, 638 A.2d 980,
983 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)) (noting that the trier of fact should consider both the amount paid and the
amount billed when determining damages).
4.
359 S.C. 100, 597 S.E.2d 142 (2004).
5.
See id. at 105, 597 S.E.2d at 145 ("While a defendant is permitted to attack the necessity
and reasonableness of medical care and costs, he cannot do so using evidence of payments made by
a collateral source.").
6.
See id. at 103, 597 S.E.2d at 144 (limiting the holding in Haselden to the facts of that
case).
7.
Id.
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A.

History and Backgroundof the CollateralSource Rule

The collateral source rule is a rule of damages as well as a rule of evidence.
The rule first arose in English common law with the inception of commercial
insurance-and was adopted throughout the United States during the nineteenth
century and beyond.9
Generally speaking, collateral source benefits are payments made by sources
other than a tortfeasor, such as an insurer. 10 In short, the collateral source rule
precludes a wrongdoer from "tak[ing] advantage of a contract between an injured
party and a third person, no matter whether the source of the funds received is an
insurance company, an employer, a family member, or other source." 1 In
situations in which an injured party receives a benefit from a collateral source,
this injured party may keep the benefit.12 Thus, the rationale for this rule is that
a tortfeasor should not receive a benefit, or windfall, if a plaintiff by
coordinating insurance or arranging for a gift was responsible for the benefit.13
Critics of the collateral source rule, on the other hand, argue that the purpose
of awarding compensatory damages is not to enable the injured party to make a
profit. 14 Although these principles are at odds with each other, courts have
reasoned that, if a windfall is going to occur, it should favor the innocent
plaintiff as opposed to the defendant. 15

8.
Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule: Seeking
GreaterFairness in Economic DamagesAwards, 76 DEF. COuNS. J. 210, 210 (2009).
9.
Id.; see also The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152, 155 (1854)
(holding that tortfeasors are liable for the full value of the damages they cause and cannot use an
injured party's relationship with a third party insurer as a defense).
10.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 920A

cmt. b (1979).

11. Covington, 359 S.C. at 103, 597 S.E.2d at 144 (quoting Pustaver v. Gooden, 350 S.C.
409, 413, 566 S.E.2d 199, 201 (Ct. App. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979) ("If the plaintiff was
himself responsible for the benefit ... the law allows him to keep it for himself. If the benefit was a
gift to the plaintiff ... he should not be deprived of the advantage that it confers.").
13. Id. ("[I]t is the position of the law that a benefit that is directed to the injured party should
not be shifted so as to become a windfall for the tortfeasor.").
14. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 21(2010).
15. See, e.g., Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1154, 1160 (Haw. 2004) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979)) (concluding that injured plaintiffs are
entitled to recover the full value of medical services without consideration for the amount actually
paid); Bardsley v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 405 S.C. 68, 78, 747 S.E.2d 436, 441 (2013) (citation
omitted) (noting that the collateral source rule exists to ensure that any windfall goes to the
plaintiff).
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B. In Certain Situations, the CollateralSource Rule Makes Sense
Several arguments support the notion that the collateral source rule is
beneficial.16 First, as previously mentioned, a windfall may ensue in some
instances.'
In such situations, it is considered more just to have the injured
person receive the windfall rather than provide relief to the tortfeasor.18 Thus,
general fairness errs on the side of providing a windfall to the innocent injured
party instead of the wrongdoer.
Second, subrogation is available under health insurance contracts that
expressly provide for it. 19 Thus, if damages paid by a wrongdoer are reduced by
the amount paid by an insurer, a plaintiff would not be made whole if the
plaintiff was required to repay the insurer.20 When a plaintiff incurs reasonable,
necessary, and customary charges by a hospital and then creates an implied
contract to pay for these services, the plaintiff may become liable for the bill or
liable for reimbursement to the insurer.21 Thus, in the private market, the
argument against an injured party receiving a windfall is generally nullified
through an insurance company's right to recuperate the payments made on
behalf of the injured party.22
Third, public policy encourages insurance, and "the collateral source rule
ensures plaintiffs will receive the benefits of their decision to carry insurance and
thereby encourages them to do so."24 More thoroughly, the collateral source rule
"embodies the venerable concept that a person who has invested years of
insurance premiums to assure his medical care should receive the benefits of his

16. See, e.g., Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 69 (Cal. 1970) ("[T]he
[collateral source] rule presently performs a number of legitimate and even indispensible
functions.").
17.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 920A

cmt. b (1979).

18. See id.
19. 44A AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1787 (2013) (citing Wajnberg v. Wunglueck, 963 N.E.2d
1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. 2007)).
20. See Helfend, 465 P.2d at 67 (noting that, when an insurance policy requires subrogation,
the plaintiff receives no double recovery when the tortfeasor pays the full amount of damages); see
also id. at 66 ("If we were to permit a tortfeasor to mitigate damages with payments from plaintiff's
insurance, plaintiff would be in a position inferior to that of having bought no insurance, because his
payment of premiums would have earned no benefit.").
21. See Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 397 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Black v. Am.
Bankers Ins. Co., 478 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. 1972)).
22. See Helfend, 465 P.2d at 67 (noting that a plaintiff receives no double recovery, and thus
no windfall, when an insurer has a right of subrogation).
23. See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1135 (Cal. 2011)
(quoting Helfend, 465 P.2d at 66-67) (noting that many insurance policies are structured to allow
the injured party to recover the full value of damages from the tortfeasors, while preventing double
recovery from both the insurer and the tortfeasor); see also Helfend, 465 P.2d at 66 ("The collateral
source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain
insurance . . . .").
24. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1135 (citing Helfend, 465 P.2d at 66).
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thrift."25 Thus, "[t]he tortfeasor should not garner the benefits of his victim's
providence." 26
C. Rule 403, South CarolinaRules ofEvidence
The collateral source rule has an evidentiary aspect as well: evidence of a
collateral payment is inadmissible at trial to reduce damages that are otherwise
recoverable.27
In fact, allowing evidence of collateral payments may be
reversible error, even if accompanied by a limiting instruction informing the jury
not to deduct the payments from its award of economic damages. 28 In
Covington, the court noted that the proper application of Rule 403 of the South
Carolina Rules of Evidence (SCRE) rendered evidence of the actual amount paid
inadmissible.29 The Covington court further explained that even allowing the
amount to be introduced apart from the "source" would generate confusion
among the jurors.30 Thus, Rule 403 of the SCRE provides the basis for a South
Carolina court to disallow evidence of the actual medical costs incurred by the
plaintiff.31
III. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN SOUTH CAROLINA: THE AFTERMATH OF
COVINGTON

A.

Haselden v. Davis

In a wrongful death and survival action brought by the decedent's estate, the
plaintiff alleged that the decedent's physician negligently failed to diagnose a
suspicious mammogram.32 By the time the decedent's physician delivered the
diagnosis-over two years after the mammogram the decedent's breast cancer
had spread to her lymph nodes. 33 At trial, her medical expenses, totaling
$77,905.21, were presented to the jury.34 Despite the amount billed, Medicaid
fully satisfied the decedent's medical bills for a total of $24,109.04.35 The
physician unsuccessfully argued at trial that, for purposes of determining
compensatory damages, the court should have admitted into evidence only the

25. Helfend, 465 P.2d at 66.
26. Id.
27. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1135.
28. Id. (citing Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc., 484 P.2d 599, 601-02 (Cal. 1971)).
29. Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100, 105, 597 S.E.2d 142, 145 (2004).
30. Id. at 104, 597 S.E.2d at 144.
31. See id.
32. Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481, 482-83, 579 S.E.2d 293, 294 (2003).
33. Id. at 483, 579 S.E.2d at 294.
34. Id.
35. Id. Therefore, Medicaid satisfied the decedent's original bill by paying only around
thirty percent of the original billed amount. See id.
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total amount actually paid by Medicaid.3 6 On appeal, the South Carolina
Supreme Court narrowed the issue to determine whether a plaintiff can submit
evidence of the total amount of billed medical expenses when a Medicaid patient
is not liable for any amounts billed in excess of the amount paid by Medicaid.3
The Haselden court explained that a plaintiff is entitled to seek compensatory
damages for the cost of medical services amounting to a reasonable value. 38 In
doing so, the court acknowledged the relevancy of the actual amount paid in
determining the reasonable value of medical services rendered, but noted that the
trier of fact must look to a variety of factors to arrive at this reasonable value. 39
Further explaining the reasonable value criteria, the court identified the amount
billed and the relative market value of services as important factors to consider. 40
Furthermore, the Haselden court made reference to comment f of section
924 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 41 supporting the notion that an injured
person should receive damages "for the value of services reasonably made
necessary by the harm."42 Recognizing that a wrongdoer would receive a
windfall should the plaintiffs damages be limited to the actual paid amount, the
court noted that limiting a plaintiffs damages to the amount actually paid by
Medicaid would contravene the collateral source rule's underlying purpose.43
Accordingly, the Haselden court held that evidence of the fully billed
amount, prior to any negotiated reduction by Medicaid, was admissible.44 The
court mentioned that limiting a plaintiffs damages to the amount Medicaid
actually paid is contrary to the collateral source rule. 45 More importantly,
however, the court did not say that allowing the actual payment amount into

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 484, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (citation omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Kashner v. Geisinger Clinic, 638 A.2d 980, 983 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)). The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania later departed somewhat from the holding in Kashner. See
Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 789-90 (Pa. 2001) (holding that, when the
tortfeasor provided medical services to the injured party, the amount paid by the injured party and
accepted by the tortfeasor was the proper amount of damages the plaintiff could recover and that
allowing the plaintiff to recover more would result in a windfall) abrogated on other grounds,
Northbrook Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 949 A.2d 333 (Pa. 2008).
41. Haselden, 353 S.C. at 484, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (citing Kashner, 638 A.2d at 983).
42.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 924

cmt. f(1979).

43. Haselden, 353 S.C. at 485, 579 S.E.2d at 295.
44. Id. In his dissent, Justice Burnett stated that the proper inquiry rests in the law of
damages and not the collateral source rule. Id. at 486, 579 S.E.2d at 296 (Burnett, J., dissenting).
Justice Burnett noted that the purpose of compensatory damages is to put an injured person in the
position that person was in prior to any wrongdoing and no more. Id. Furthermore, Justice Burnett
opined that the plaintiff never actually incurred the medical expense and, therefore, allowing the
plaintiff to recover for the amount billed to Medicaid is inconsistent with this principle of law. Id.
at 486-87, 579 S.E.2d at 296.
45. Id. at 485, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (majority opinion).
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evidence contravened the collateral source rule. 46 This holding is consistent with
the court's discussion noting that the ultimate goal is to utilize all available
evidence to allow the jury to determine the reasonable value of medical services
when determining compensatory damages.47
Therefore, after Haselden, a defendant cannot assert that a plaintiffs
compensatory damages were limited to only the amount that Medicaid accepted
as full payment. 48 In determining compensatory damages, however, a factfinder
could utilize several factors-including the amount billed and the amount paid
to arrive at the reasonable value of medical services rendered.49
B.

Covington v. George

In Covington, the plaintiff brought an action stemming from an automobile
50
accident with the defendant.
At trial, the defendant sought to introduce
evidence that, despite the plaintiffs much higher original bill, her health care
51
provider accepted, as full payment, a significantly reduced payment amount.
The trial judge refused to allow the defendant to show that, although the
plaintiffs original medical bills totaled $3,399.00, her health care provider
accepted $647.47 as payment in full.52
The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred this case under Rule 204(b)
of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, thus precluding a ruling by the
court of appeals on this issue.53 Relying on the court's ruling in Haselden v.
Davis just one year prior, the defendant argued that he was entitled to present
evidence that a medical provider accepted as full payment an amount less than
what this same medical provider billed for its services.54 The defendant further
argued that, to dispute the reasonableness of the medical costs sought, he should

46. See id. (noting that, while the amount paid is not sufficient by itself to determine the
reasonable value of medical services, it is relevant to establishing damages). This signifies the
court's recognition of a clear difference between limiting a plaintiffs recovery to a certain amount
and prohibiting a defendant from providing material evidence that further assists a factfinder in
arriving at a reasonable value. See id.
47. See id. at 484, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (citing Kashner v. Geisinger Clinic, 638 A.2d 980, 983
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)).
48. See id. at 485, 579 S.E.2d at 295.
49. See id. at 484, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (citing Kashner, 638 A.2d at 983).
50. Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100, 101, 597 S.E.2d 142, 143 (2004).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 102, 597 S.E.2d at 143. Therefore, Medicare fully satisfied the plaintiffs medical
bills for less than twenty percent of the original price. See id. at 102 & n.2, 597 S.E.2d at 143 &
n.2. Of note, the defendant only sought to reveal the amount paid to satisfy the plaintiffs bills, and
not the source of payment. Id. at 102, 597 S.E.2d at 143.
53. See id. at 102, 597 S.E.2d at 143 ("Did the trial court err in refusing to allow George to
present evidence that the amount Covington's medical provider accepted in payment was less than
what it charged for its services?").
54. Id. (citing Haseldenv. Davis, 353 S.C. 481, 484, 579 S.E.2d 293, 295 (2003)).
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be able to present evidence of what the health care provider accepted as payment
in full. 55
In holding that the trial court properly excluded the defendant's evidence,
the supreme court explained its decision in Haselden.56 Noting that the
introduction of evidence was not at issue on appeal in Haselden, the Covington
court stated that the issue of whether the amount actually paid may be used to
establish the reasonableness of medical expenses was "ancillary" to the main
issue in Haselden.5 The court explained that both the billed and paid amounts
in Haselden were already introduced as evidence at trial. Contrary to the issue
statement in the Haselden opinion, the Covington court stated that the issue in
Haselden was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the difference
between the actual payment and the billed amount.59
After determining that the negotiated amounts accepted by a health care
provider represent contractual negotiations, rather than the "prevailing costs" of
the services rendered, the Covington court held during its discussion the
difference between paid and billed amounts for rendered health care servicesthat the collateral source rule was directly implicated in this case. 60 Therefore,
the court concluded that "the actual payment amount was properly excluded" at
trial. 61
In clarifying the rule, the Covington court explained that "[t]he collateral
source rule provides that compensation received by an injured party from a
source wholly independent of the wrongdoer will not reduce the damages owed
by the wrongdoer."62 Thus, the court explained that the proper application of
SCRE Rule 403 and the collateral source rule demand that trial courts exclude
63
evidence of the actual payment amount at trial.
The Covington court also supported its decision by citing a Florida case
involving the collateral source rule and evidence of contractual "write-offs" by
medical providers.64 In that case, the court held that "the collateral source rule

55.
56.

Id. at 102-03, 597 S.E.2d at 143.
See id. at 103, 597 S.E.2d at 143-44 (citing Haselden, 341 S.C. at 501, 534 S.E.2d 295 at

303).
57. Id. at 103, 597 S.E.2d at 143.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 103, 597 S.E.2d at 143-44. In the Haselden opinion itself, however, the South
Carolina Supreme Court clearly identified the issue: "Is evidence of amounts billed by a treating
physician admissible to establish a medical malpractice plaintiff's damages, where the plaintiff is a
Medicaid patient who is not liable for any amounts billed in excess of the amount paid by
Medicaid?" Haselden, 353 S.C. at 483, 579 S.E.2d at 294.
60. Covington, 359 S.C. at 103-04, 597 S.E.2d at 144 (citing Radvany v. Davis, 551 S.E.2d
347, 348 (Va. 2001)).
61. Id. at 102, 597 S.E.2d at 143.
62. Id. at 103, 597 S.E.2d at 144 (quoting Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Gregory, 320
S.C. 90, 92, 463 S.E.2d 317, 318 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 105, 597 S.E.2d at 145.
64. See id. at 104-05, 597 S.E.2d at 144 (quoting Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406, 409,
410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
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prohibited introduction of contractual discounts that were 'written-off by the
medical providers." 65
Therefore, just one year after Haselden, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina executed an about-face regarding the application of the collateral source
rule with respect to a defendant's ability to introduce evidence of the actual
amount paid to fully satisfy a plaintiff s medical bills. 66
C. Summary of CurrentLaw in South Carolina
After Covington, it is now settled law that a plaintiff can submit into
evidence a "list price" medical bill of services for the purposes of allowing a jury
to determine the reasonable value of those medical services, regardless of what
amount was actually paid to fully satisfy these medical obligations.67 A
defendant, on the other hand, cannot produce evidence that the actual amount
paid was less-or even substantially less than the amount originally printed on
the bill, even if the defendant refrains from identifying the source of the
payment.68 Therefore, even Medicaid recipients who do not realize any
personal loss for medical expenses paid can pocket a windfall at the
defendant's expense.69

65. Id. at 104, 597 S.E.2d at 144 (quoting Goble, 848 So. 2d at 409). The full Goble opinion
details how Florida's legislature enacted a statutory exception for this exact type of case, as well as
how the Supreme Court of Florida refined the exception when asked whether it is appropriate to set
off a plaintiff's reasonable damages when a medical provider has written off an equal portion of the
medical bills pursuant to a contract with a health maintenance organization. See Goble, 848 So. 2d
at 408-10 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Florida explained that it was proper for the
district court to permit a setoff in damages for contractual discounts, as this setoff was consistent
with the legislature's intent to reduce the litigation costs that arise when insurers are required to pay
damages beyond what the injured party actually incurred. See Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830,
832-33 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Goble, 848 So. 2d at 410).
66. See Covington, 359 S.C. at 105, 597 S.E.2d at 145. Of note, Justice Burnett, the author of
the dissent in Haselden, concurred with the Covington opinion. See id.; Haselden v. Davis, 353
S.C. 481, 485, 579 S.E.2d 293, 295 (2003) (Burnett, J., dissenting). While it is not clear from the
record, it appears that the plaintiff in Covington was a Medicare recipient, while the plaintiff in
Haselden was a Medicaid recipient. See Covington, 359 S.C. at 102 n.2, 597 S.E.2d at 143 n.2;
Haselden, 353 S.C. at 483, 579 S.E.2d at 294.
67. See supra Part III.B.
68. See Covington, 359 S.C. at 104, 105, S.E.2d at 144, 145 (holding that a defendant cannot
use evidence of the actual payment amount in establishing the reasonableness of medical costs
because "any attempts on the part of the plaintiff to explain the compromised payments would
necessarily lead to the existence of a collateral source").
69. See Haselden, 353 S.C. at 485, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (recognizing, but failing to follow, a
line of cases that held that "to allow a plaintiff to claim the billed amount, as opposed to the paid
amount, would result in a windfall [to the plaintiff]").
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IV. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
While South Carolina courts currently employ the collateral source rule to
prevent a defendant from introducing evidence of the amount paid to fully satisfy
an injured party's medical bills, other jurisdictions have arrived at a host of
different conclusions regarding the effect of the collateral source rule on a
plaintiffs recovery of compensatory damages.
Some jurisdictions agree with
South Carolina's approach as outlined in Covington. 1 Other jurisdictions,
however, have modified the collateral source rule through common law to
address the disparity between the "full" price and the actual amount paid to fully
72
satisfy the same bill.
Furthermore, some states have decided to address the
rising costs of insurance, the expensive costs of litigation, and the recent
hyperinflation of medical costs through legislation.
These states are further
divided on whether to address this disparity in the private insurance context, as

70. See, e.g., Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 495, 497 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that Arizona is among the majority of states that allow injured parties to recover the full,
reasonable value of their medical expenses, but also noting that the collateral source rule is subject
to legislative abrogation, and per Arizona statutory law, medical malpractice defendants are allowed
to present evidence of collateral source payments during trial); Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40
& n.26 (Del. 2005) (concluding that the trial judge violated the state's commitment to the collateral
source rule by refusing to allow an injured party to present evidence of the full amount of that
party's medical bills because nothing indicated that the plaintiff received an offset from a public
source); Olariu v. Marrero, 549 S.E.2d 121, 123, 124 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a tortfeasor
cannot use a third-party write-off of a victim's medical expenses to reduce the damages owed to the
victim and that, while the plaintiff s recovery should be reduced by the amount of any medical debt
discharged through bankruptcy, because of the risk of unfair prejudice, a defendant does not have an
absolute right to present evidence of the discharge to the jury).
71. See, e.g., Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 739 (N.C. 1987) (determining it was
preferable that blameworthy defendants bear the burden of any loss caused by operation of the
collateral source rule and holding that any evidence that "gratuitous public benefits served, and will
serve, to mitigate plaintiffs damages violates the collateral source rule"); Fye v. Kennedy, 991
S.W.2d 754, 764 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]here is no reason to differentiate between a payment
from a collateral source and a gratuity from a collateral source." (emphasis added)); Ellsworth v.
Schelbrock, 611 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Wis. 2000) (quoting Rixmann v. Somerset Pub. Sch., St. Croix
Cnty., 266 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1978); McLaughlin v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., 143
N.W.2d 32, 40 (Wis. 1966)) (noting that damages should be measured by their value, not by their
actual cost to the injured party).
72. See, e.g., Boutte v. Kelly, 863 So. 2d 530, 553 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Suhor v.
Lagasse, 770 So. 2d 422, 423, 425-26 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So. 2d 1026,
1027, 1029-30 (La. Ct. App. 2000)) (distinguishing between an amount "paid" and an amount
"discounted" by Medicare and holding that the collateral source rule does not apply to evidence of
the amount "written-off' by Medicare, thus allowing the plaintiffs to recover only the amount
actually paid).
73. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-212(b) (2005) (limiting evidence of damages to the
amount actually paid or the unpaid amount for which the plaintiff is legally responsible); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a (2013) (citations omitted) (requiring post-verdict reductions of
damages for amounts received from collateral sources, unless the collateral source has a right of
subrogation).
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well as the Medicare and Medicaid context, or to simply modify the collateral
source rule with respect to Medicare, Medicaid, or both.
A.

Policy Considerations

Two competing policy considerations are at the heart of each jurisdiction's
analysis of the rate differential with respect to the collateral source rule. The
first consideration is the need to protect the tort recovery of an injured party.
The second consideration involves the health care system and the economic
effects of recent hyperinflation of medical costs, expensive litigation, and rising
insurance premiums.
B. Different Jurisdictions'AnalyticFrameworks
Each jurisdiction, in its unique approach to the rate differential conundrum,
focuses on at least one of several key analytic frameworks to justify its outcome.
While some jurisdictions, like South Carolina, focus on allowing plaintiffs to
recover the reasonable and necessary costs in computing compensatory
damages, other jurisdictions highlight the growing problem of hyperinflation in
medical costs.76 Also, several jurisdictions analyze the law of damages in
determining whether to apply the collateral source rule to this issue.
Finally,
several jurisdictions focus on whether the plaintiff actually incurred the
substantially higher full price and, therefore, should recover.
C. The Varying InterpretationsofReasonableness
As previously mentioned, the Haselden court noted that the ultimate goal of
compensatory damages for medical costs is to allow the injured party to recover
the reasonable value of medical services rendered.79 The Covington court further
argued that, while the goal is to allow a plaintiff to recover the reasonable value

74. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (1999) (allowing the introduction of public, but
not private, collateral sources into evidence); Dyet v. McKinley, 81 P.3d 1236, 1238-1239 (Idaho
2003) (affirming a trial court's decision to prohibit the defendant from presenting evidence during
trial of the amount of medical expenses the plaintiff actually paid, but reduced the jury award by the
amount of charges "written off" by Medicare because this prevented a windfall to the plaintiff). The
Supreme Court of Idaho held that "[t]he [trial] court correctly refused to allow [the defendant] to
present evidence to the jury regarding the amounts actually paid to [the plaintiffs] medical
providers." Id. at 1238.
75. See Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481, 484, 579 S.E.2d 293, 295 (2003) (citation omitted).
76. See infra notes 109-134 and accompanying text.
77. See infra Part IV.C.2.
78. See infra Part IV.C.3.
79. See Haselden, 353 S.C. at 484, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (citation omitted).
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of damages incurred, the collateral source rule requires that the actual payment
amount be excluded from the jury.so
Interestingly, although the Florida Supreme Court utilized the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in concluding that a plaintiff should recover the reasonable
value of medical costs, Florida statutes specifically limit a plaintiffs recovery in
The full Goble opinion partially cited in Covington this very situation.
explained that it is proper to permit a setoff in damages for contractual discounts
because this setoff is "consistent with the Legislature's intent to reduce the
litigation costs that arise when insurers are required to pay damages beyond what
83
the injured party actually incurred."
Thus, through a statutory exception to the
collateral source rule, a defendant in Florida may not present evidence of the
actual amount paid, but may compel the court to reduce the plaintiffs damages
to the amount actually paid.8 4 Furthermore, Florida's analysis is not limited to
government funded insurance programs, but also applies in the private insurance
context as well. 5
The Texas Supreme Court also identified the potential confusion a jury may
encounter while determining the reasonable value of medical costs when given
both the full amount and the actual amount paid to satisfy a plaintiffs medical
bills.8 6 Enacted in 2003, section 41.0105 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code provides that "recovery of medical or health care expenses
incurred is limited to the amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of the
claimant."8
Applying this statute, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the
reduction of the plaintiffs awarded damages from $110,069.12 to $27,739.43
because "only evidence of recoverable medical expenses is admissible at trial."

80. See Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100, 105, 597 S.E.2d 142, 145 (2004) (concluding
that evidence of the actual payment amount is not admissible to prove the reasonableness of medical
expenses).
81. See Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d 406, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the
court's decision was consistent with an "intent to fully compensate" the plaintiff), aff'd, 901 So. 2d
830 (Fla. 2005); see also Goble v. Frohman, 901 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 2005) (citing FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.76 (West 2011)) ("[U]nder section 768.76, the amount of the contractual discount, for
which no right of reimbursement or subrogation exists, is an amount that should be set off against
an award of compensatory damages.").
82. See Covington, 359 S.C. at 104-05, 597 S.E.2d at 144 (quoting Goble, 848 So. 2d at
410).
83. Goble, 901 So. 2d at 832 (emphasis added) (quoting Goble, 848 So. 2d at 410) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
84. See id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West 2011)) (describing a defendant who
successfully argued that the court reduce a damages award by the amount the plaintiffs medical
providers contractually agreed to discount).
85. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(1) (providing that damages reductions apply regardless of
the nature of the insurer). On the other hand, the statute states that "there shall be no reduction for
collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists." Id.
86. See Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 398 (Tex. 2011) (citing TEX. R. EVID.
403).
87. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.0105 (West 2008).
88. Haygood, 356 S.W.3d at 392, 399.
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However, the court pointed out that the plaintiff, as a Medicare Part B recipient,
was ultimately charged a reasonable amount because "[f]ederal law prohibits
health care providers who agree to treat Medicare patients from charging more
than Medicare has determined to be reasonable."89 Essentially, through
application of a statutory exception to the collateral source rule, the Texas
Supreme Court defined reasonablemedical bills as the amount that a health care
provider customarily bills for the same or similar services.90
Through common law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court settled the
definition of reasonablein a similar situation, stating that "where, as here, the
exact amount of expenses has been established by contract and those expenses
have been satisfied, there is no lon er any issue as to the amount of expenses for
which the plaintiff will be liable."
Pennsylvania limits a plaintiff s recovery to
the actual amount paid in both the private insurance context and the Medicare
context. 92
Applying this same analysis to arrive at the opposite conclusion with respect
to a plaintiffs demand, 93 the Supreme Court of Hawaii noted that "the
Restatement declares that the collateral source rule applies to 'gratuities."' 94
Furthermore, the court specifically pointed to the Restatement's comments and
explained that "social security benefits, welfare payments, [and] pensions under
special requirement acts" are benefits to which the collateral source rule must
apply.95 Therefore, the court determined that the amount charged is not
dispositive of the reasonable value and the collateral source rule bars a defendant
from submitting the amount actually paid into evidence to reduce damages but
evidence of the amounts billed is not irrelevant or inadmissible. 96
Reaching a similar result, the Tennessee Court of Appeals was also
persuaded by the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 920A.
Notably, the
court opined that, per comment b of section 920A, courts should apply the
collateral source rule such that a tortfeasor is "responsible for all harm that he

89. Id. at 392 (emphasis added) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)-(2) (2006)).
90. See id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 405.502(a) (2011)).
91. See Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 789 (Pa. 2001).
92. See id.
93. See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1155-57 (Haw. 2004) (quoting Sam Teague, Ltd.
v. Haw. Civil Rights Comm'n, 971 P.2d 1104, 1118 (Haw. 1999)); Barham ex rel. Barham v.
Rubin, 816 P.2d 965, 967 (Haw. 1991); Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 737-38 (N.C. 1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 920A

cmt. c(3), (4) (1979)).

94. Id. at 1155 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. c (1979)) (likening a
doctor not charging for all services rendered or reducing the bill based on a patient's circumstances
to a gratuity).
95. Id. at 1156 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. c(4) (1979)).
96. See id. at 1157, 1160, 1163.
97. See Fye v. Kennedy, 991 SW.2d 754, 763-64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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causes." 98 Moreover, the court saw no reason to differentiate between a payment
and a gratuity if both originated from a collateral source.99
Also of note, Massachusetts enacted legislation to address damages
reductions. 100 In Sylvestre v. Martin,101 the Massachusetts Superior Court
explained that section 60G is part of a "comprehensive set of reforms
enacted . . . to avert a perceived crisis in the medical profession relating to the

burgeoning cost of medial malpractice insurance and litigation.", 102 In Sylvestre,
the plaintiffs original medical bills totaled $260,122.25.103 However, the
MassHealth Casualty Recovery Unit paid $9,496.55 to the plaintiff's health care
provider in full and final satisfaction of the original bill. 104 The court explained
that the legislative intent behind section 60G was to "protect plaintiffs from a
double loss of benefits by cancelling the rights of subrogation and lien perfection
previously held by entities providing collateral benefits."105 In sum, the intent
was to ensure that a plaintiff could recover the reasonable expenses incurred,
while preventing both losses and windfalls to the plaintiff. 106
The Sylvestre court, however, explained that a Medicaid write-off is "an
amount which [is] extinguished by operation of federal law and was neither paid
out nor received by any entity."107 Therefore, allowing a plaintiff to recover this
Medicaid write-off would not further the Massachusetts legislature's goal of
preventing excessive medical malpractice awards. os
1. Flaws in the CurrentMedical PricingSystem
When a hospital bills its regular rates, or list prices, these rates "are at least
double, and may be up to eight times what the hospital would accept as payment
in full for the same services from Medicare, Medicaid, [Health Maintenance
Organizations], or private insurers."l09 Furthermore, the very term full-or

98. Id. at 764 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b) (1979) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

99. Id.
100. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 60G (1986) (addressing reduction of damages awards
and collateral sources of benefits).
101. Sylvestre v. Martin, No. SUCV200305988, 2008 WL 82631 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2008).
102. Id. at *5 (citing Darviris v. Petros, 812 N.E.2d 1188, 1195 (Mass. 2004); McGuiggan v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 147 (Mass. 1986) (Lynch, J., concurring)).
103. Id. at *1.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *6 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 60G).
106. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 60G.
107. Sylvestre, 2008 WL 82631, at *5.
108. Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines reasonable as "fair, proper, or moderate under the
circumstances." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293 (8th ed. 2004). One would likely struggle to
conclude that a medical bill is reasonable if $260,122.25 is fully satisfied for just 3.65% of its face
value, or $9,496.55. See Sylvestre, 2008 WL 82631, at *1. This discrepancy certainly calls into
question the pricing structure of this particular health care provider.
109. George A. Nation, III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability and
HospitalBilling ofthe Uninsured,94 KY. L.J. 101, 104 (2006).
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list-is fallacious when, nationally, less than five percent of patients actually pay
this full amount.110
Hospitals establish their full prices "with the clear expectation that they will
receive only a portion of these so-called 'full charges."' II
Because
reimbursement rates are often set as a percentage of a hospital's list price,
hospitals are financially pressured into establishing their full price list as high as
possible.112 Given that only the uninsured are somewhat expected to pay the full
price, hospitals are extremely reluctant to discount this full price for fear that,
under federal regulations for Medicare and Medicaid, their reimbursement from
Medicare or Medicaid could be drastically reduced.113 Thus, hospitals lack any
incentive to reduce their full prices to more closely align with the amounts they
actually receive on average for the same charge. 114
Against a backdrop of the collateral source rule and health care pricing
practices, the Texas legislature enacted legislation to address the problem
discussed above."
In examining this legislation, the Texas Supreme Court
recognized that the current health care pricing system has drastically evolved in
recent years, noting that health care charges-once based on the provider's cost
and profit margin-are now driven by government regulation and private
insurers' negotiation efforts. 116
Thus, "[a] two-tiered structure has evolved: 'list' or 'full' rates sometimes
charged to uninsured patients, but frequently uncollected, and reimbursement
rates for patients covered by government and private insurance."11 In Haygood
v. De Escabedo," the court heard testimony from the plaintiffs health care
provider arguing that the charges billed to the plaintiff were reasonable, despite
the fact that the provider's "charges were four times the amount they were
entitled to collect." 19
The court stated that section 41.0105 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code limits the recovery of medical or health care expenses to "the
amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of' the plaintiff.120 In further
explaining its decision, the court cast serious doubt on the congruence of the full
bill amount and the actual value of the plaintiffs damages. 121 By essentially

110. Id.
111. Id. at 118.
112. Id. at 119.
113. Id. at 134 35.
114. See id. at 135. Professor Nation further argued that courts should hold the contract to pay
for services based on this full price unenforceable, as a matter of law, because the disparity between
the full price and the amounts all insurers generally accept as full payment renders the contract
unconscionable. See id at 136-37.
115. Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 392 93 (Tex. 2011).
116. See id. at 393.
117. Id.
118. 356 S.W.3d 390.
119. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 391 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 41.0105

(West2008)).

121. See id. at 394.
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ignoring the health care provider's testimony regarding the value of the medical
services rendered, the Haygood court held that a plaintiff may only submit
"evidence at trial[] [of] expenses that the provider has a legal right to be paid."1 22
Likewise, in 2011, the California Supreme Court acknowledged the growing
separation between a health care provider's full price and the amounts the
provider contractually accepts as full payment.123 In explaining its decision to
part from previous precedent, the court recognized in Howell v. Hamilton Meats
& Provisions, Inc. 24 that it had previously observed the "legitimate and even
indispensible functions" of the collateral source rule.125 The Howell court,
however, determined that its previous ruling did not "consider how the collateral
source rule would apply to damages for past medical expenses when the amount
billed for medical services substantially exceeds the amount accepted in full
payment."l26
The Howell court discussed the history of changes and influences on medical
costs over the past fifty years.127 Citing to a 2005 Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission study, the court explained how disparities between charges and
costs have grown significantly in recent years.128 The 2005 study discussed the
competing influences of competitors, payers, regulators, and customers,
concluding that a hospital's charges may not relate systematically to costs. 129
Furthermore, the Howell court noted that the rise of managed care organizations
has led to increases in prices for the uninsured or those who are not members of
a healthcare organization.130
To demonstrate this point, the Howell court explained that essentially
everyone paid the same rates in 1960 because discounts negotiated by managed
care were nonexistent.131 More eloquently put, "because so many patients,
insured, uninsured, and recipients under government health care programs[] pay
discounted rates, hospital bills have been called insincere, in the sense that they

122. Id. at 391 (citing Garza de Escabedo v. Haygood, 283 S.W.3d 3 (Tex. App. 2009), aff'd,
356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011)).
123. See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1135, 1143 (Cal.
2011).
124. 257 P.3d 1130.
125. See id. at 1135 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid
Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 69 (Cal. 1970)).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1141 (quoting Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers:
Courts, Contracts,and the New MedicalMarketplace, 106 MICH. L. REv. 643, 663 (2008)).
128. See id. (quoting ALLEN DOBSON ET AL., A STUDY OF HOSPITAL CHARGE SETTING

PRACTICES, at v (2005), available at http://www.medpac.gov/publications/contractor reports/Dec
05_Charge setting.pdf).
129. See id. (quoting DOBSON ET AL., supra note 128, at v)
130. Id. (quoting Hall & Schneider, supra note 127, at 663).
131. See id. (quoting Hall & Schneider, supra note 127, at 663).
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would yield truly enormous profits if those prices were actually paid."l32 As this
disparity continues to grow, attempting to broadly generalize the relationship
between the cost of medical services and the full amount that a provider bills
"would be perilous."1 33
In summarizing the difficulty of attaching a value to medical services
rendered solely based on a health care provider's bill, the Howell court stated
that "[g]iven this state of medical economics, how a market value other than that
produced by negotiation between the insurer and the provider could be identified
is unclear."1 34 Therefore, the Howell court determined that the collateral source
rule does not expand the scope of reasonable economic damages to include
unreasonable expenses that a plaintiff has not and will not incur.135
Analogous to the court's chief aim of determining the reasonable value of
medical services rendered particularly amid the inconsistent and illogical
pricin structure of today the Howell court did note one exception to the
136
rule.
The court distinguished donative gifts and discounted payments as a
result of negotiations between an insurer and a health care provider.137 In line
with the holding that a plaintiff may only recover amounts paid or incurred as
this more accurately suggests the actual value the court noted that, when a
health care provider gratuitously donates services to a plaintiff, the collateral
source rule will apply and the court will not limit the plaintiff's recovery.138
2.

Law ofDamages

Another area of focus that has shaped jurisdictional approaches to the rate
differential in medical costs is the law of damages. For example, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin highlighted the meaning of damages and explained that
recovery is not for the expenditures actually made or obligations incurred, but
rather for the value of the medical services rendered.139 In Ellsworth v.
Shelbrook,140 the court concluded that the collateral source rule barred the
defendant from showing that the plaintiffs medical bills were satisfied for

132. Id. at 1142 (quoting Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos
Behind a Veil of Secrecy, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 57, 63) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 1133.
136. See id. at 1139-40 (citations omitted).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1139.
139. See Ellsworth v. Shelbrock, 611 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Wis. 2000) (citation omitted) (quoting
Rixmann v. Somerset Pub. Sch., St. Croix Cnty., 266 N.W.2d 326, 330-31 (Wis. 1978);
McLaughlin v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry., Co., 143 N.W.2d 32, 40-41 (Wis. 1966)).
140. 611 N.W.2d 764.
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substantially less than what the health care provider charged, as the amount paid
was not dispositive of the actual value.141
Conversely, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that medical expenses
contractually written off pursuant to the Medicaid program requirements are not
recoverable damages.142 In Terrell v. Nanda,143 the plaintiffs medical bills
totaled $1,110,922.82, but Medicaid fully satisfied the plaintiffs bills for
$164,084.82.144 Relying on the collateral source rule, the plaintiff argued that he
was entitled to recover the full amount.145 The Terrell court, however, reasoned
that the plaintiff never became obligated to satisfy the medical expenses incurred
by the health care provider.146 Further, the court noted that the plaintiff was
informed that, as a Medicaid recipient, he would have no responsibility for the
bill.147 The court also explained that the health care provider knew it would
receive payment from Medicaid and that the provider was prohibited from
billing or accepting payment from the plaintiff.
Concluding that recoverable
damages require an obligation, the court stated that, "[u]nder these
circumstances, the requirements for giving rise to a natural obligation are not
met, and no natural obligation exists." 9
The Hawaii Supreme Court has also discussed the law of damages and noted
its concern with creating various new categories of plaintiffs based on their type
of insurance, and not on the nature of their injuries, in Bynum v. Magno.150 In
his dissent, Justice Moon reasoned that compensatory damages seek to
"compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more."15 1
Because medical expenses are recoverable as compensatory damages, allowing a
plaintiff to recover more than an amount the plaintiff is legally obligated to pay
would put the plaintiff in a better position than that maintained before the wrong

occurred.

152

The Supreme Court of California also discussed the law of damages in the
Howell case, holding that a plaintiff may not recover contractually written-off
amounts. 153 The court stated that, for a plaintiffs expenses to be recoverable,

141. See id. at 771.
142. See Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
143. 759 So. 2d 1026.
144. Id. at 1028. The original medical bills were written down by $946,838. Id. Thus,
Medicaid only paid 14.8% of the original bill. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1030.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. 101 P.3d 1149, 1162 (Haw. 2004).
151. Id. at 1163 (Moon, J., dissenting) (quoting Kuhnert v. Allison, 868 P.2d 457, 462 (Haw.
1994)).
152. Id. at 1165.
153. See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1137-38, 1140-41
(Cal. 2011) (citations omitted).
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the expenses "must be both incurred and reasonable."1 54 The court further
explained that if a plaintiff negotiates a discount and thereby reduces the costs
incurred, the plaintiff cannot recover damages for the greater amount, as "the
plaintiff has not suffered a pecuniary loss or other detriment in the greater
amount."15 5 According to the Howell court:
While the measure of recovery for the costs of services a third party
renders is ordinarily the reasonable value of those services, "[i]f. . . the
injuredperson paid less than the exchange rate, he can recover no more
than the amount paid,except when the low rate was intended as a gift to
him."1 56
3.

The PlaintiffNever Incurredthe GreaterExpense

Along with the previously discussed analytic frameworks, some jurisdictions
give deference to the fact that the plaintiff never actually incurred the
substantially higher expense.1 5 In Howell, the Supreme Court of California also
noted that when the plaintiff actually received the medical bill, her health care
provider had already agreed to the substantially lower price with the insurer. 158
Accordingly, "Having never incurred the full bill, [the] plaintiff could not
recover it in damages for economic loss. For this reason alone, the collateral
source rule would be inapplicable."1 59
Returning to Goble v. Frohman 60-a case that the South Carolina Supreme
161
Court cited in Covington v. George
Justice Bell of the Florida Supreme
Court, in a concurring opinion, noted that the pre-discount amount of the
plaintiffs medical bills "lies wholly outside the question of 'collateral sources'
either as defined by statute or at common law."6 Justice Bell further reasoned
that, because the plaintiff never paid the full medical bill and was not obligated
to pay it, he could not recover any amount greater than that which he was
obligated to pay.163

154. Id. at 1138 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3359 (West 1997)).
155. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3281, 3282 (West 1997)).
156. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 911 cmt. h (1979)).
157. See, e.g., id. at 1143 (concluding that a plaintiff could not recover the full bill in damages
for economic loss and that the collateral source rule did not apply solely because the plaintiff never
incurred the expense of the full bill).
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. 901 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 2005).
161. 359 S.C. 100, 104-05, 597 S.E.2d 142, 144 (2004) (citing Goble v. Frohman, 848 So. 2d
406, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
162. Goble, 901 So. 2d at 833 (Bell, J., concurring).
163. Id.
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Conversely, some courts, such as the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
permit plaintiffs to recover the amount of gratuitous government benefits, 164
despite other courts acknowledging that such plaintiffs were never obligated to
pay for the gratuities provided by Medicaid. 16 In Cates v. Wilson,166 the court
reasoned that the difference between the full bill and the amount actually paid
inherently created a windfall and "as between defendants who tortiously inflict
injury and innocent taxpayers who fund programs such as Medicaid, we think it
better that the loss fall on the tortfeasor." 6 7
Other jurisdictions disagree with the rationale that because a windfall is
unavoidable, it must be better for the plaintiff to receive the windfall. 16In Wills
v. Foster,169 the Supreme Court of Illinois reasoned that the purpose of
compensatory damages is not to punish defendants or bestow a windfall upon
plaintiffs. 1 70 Further, the idea that the plaintiff should enjoy any windfall that
may result "borders too closely on approval of unwarranted punitive
damages." 1
V.

THE CURRENT APPROACH IN SOUTH CAROLINA NEEDS CHANGE

In South Carolina, a plaintiff may recover a substantially higher amount in
compensatory damages than what was actually paid to fully satisfy the billed
amount.172
In looking at how different jurisdictions have approached
compensatory damages for plaintiffs, the issue of whether to allow a defendant
to contest the reasonableness of the billed amount is overshadowed by the
question of whether the billed amount is even an accurate indication of the value
itself. 173
The collateral source rule does serve a purpose and provides several
benefits. Society clearly benefits from encouraging all citizens to procure

164. See, e.g., Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 739 (N.C. 1987).
165. See, e.g., Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So. 2d 1026, 1031 (La. Ct. App. 2000) ("[W]e now hold
that a plaintiff may not recover as damages that portion of medical expenses 'contractually adjusted'
or 'written-off' by a healthcare provider pursuant to the requirements of the Medicaid program.
Such expenses are not damages incurred by the injured plaintiff and are not subject to recovery by
application of the 'collateral source' rule.").
166. 361 S.E.2d734.
167. See id. at 739. This quote from the North Carolina Supreme Court seems to imply that
the defendant is not a taxpayer.
168. See, e.g., Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ill. 2008) (citing Wills v. Foster, 867
N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), rev'd, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. 2008)) (concluding that the
collateral source rule prevents double recovery because a right of subrogation or a lien typically
exists).
169. 892 N.E.2d 1018.
170. Id. at 1023 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979)).
171. Id. (quoting Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1979),
overruled by Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1031).
172. See supra notes 59-61, 67-69 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
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insurance and be good stewards of their potential economic impact on others
through tortious behavior.17 4 Ensuring that plaintiffs receive the benefit of their
decision to purchase and maintain insurance is also beneficial to society.
However, the logical conclusions about the collateral source rule stop here.
The argument that it is better to allow the plaintiff to receive a windfall because a
windfall will inherently occurl76 completely lacks merit. As the Bynum dissent
aptly explained, allowing a plaintiff to only recover the amount paid directly to
satisfy the amount billed avoids a windfall to eitherparty.1
In essence, states
do not have to create a windfall in compensatory damages. Furthermore, if the
goal of compensatory damages is to put an injured party in the place that party
was in prior to the wrongdoing, how can this be justified if the party receives far
more than the exact amount paid to satisfy the medical bill?
Under the logic that "but for" the insurance payment, the plaintiff would be
responsible for the bill, one can easily rationalize that the plaintiff should be
obligated to pay the same amount as the insurance payment. Adhering to this
logic, a plaintiff would require reimbursement simply for the amount that a
health care provider receives to discharge the bill.
Moreover, the plaintiff should bear the burden of pleading all damages
accurately by including loss of earning power, future medical costs, and even
punitive damages. The plaintiff should account for the specific purposes of these
particular damages. The focus must be on looking at damages categorically and
allowing a jury to award these amounts based on the current application of the
law of damages.
In light of recent hyperinflation of medical costs and the ever-evolving
changes in the health care industry, how can South Carolina courts utilize a
health care provider's excessively inflated list price to standardize the amount a
jury will review in determining compensatory damages? 1 As the Howell court
noted, it seems that professionals in the health insurance industry are in the
strongest position to determine and negotiate the actual value of medical services
rendered. 9 By simply looking at the undue influences that push health care
providers to continue raising their list prices for the sole purpose of also raising
the negotiated values they will undoubtedly receive from insurance companies, a
prudent and reasonable person would clearly discard the list price from the
analysis of what seems fair.

174. See supra Part II.B.
175. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
176. See Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 739 (N.C. 1987).
177. See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1167 (Haw. 2004) (Moon, J., dissenting).
178. See supra notes 109-14, 123 29 and accompanying text.
179. See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1142 (Cal. 2011)
("Patients individually suffer inherent disadvantages that significantly impede negotiating prices
with medical care providers: difficulty in gathering information, lack of choice and bargaining
power, and possible physical and emotional disabilities relating to the injury or illness.").
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With many jurisdictions attempting to address the issues of rising costs in
insurance premiums, litigation, and health care, it seems that these jurisdictions
have identified a problem in the economics of the health care industry.180
Because the potential economic effects of the health care industry are similar in
most jurisdictions, these jurisdictions have effectively identified a cause-andeffect relationship between the net costs of insurance and litigation. As insurers
calculate their risk pools based on potential payouts over a set term, these
insurers are, in turn, obligated to collect premiums from all customers such that
they are able to meet their payout obligations. 181
It does not require a complex analysis to realize that, if a potential payout is
eight times greater in one particular state compared to another, then an insurer
will need to collect significantly higher premiums to meet its potential payment
obligations from the risk pool of people residing in the state with higher payouts.
Furthermore, it is certainly foreseeable that the risk of potentially higher payouts
could discourage some insurers from doing business in a particular state. Courts
must realize the error in assigning the title reasonable to a grossly inflated
medical service bill.
To right this ship, South Carolina has two different options to choose from.
First, the state supreme court can revive Haselden and allow a jury to determine
the reasonable value of medical services rendered by viewing both the full bill
and the amount actually paid. Second, similar to Florida and many other
jurisdictions, the South Carolina General Assembly can elect to enact legislation
that creates statutory exemptions to the collateral source rule.
A.

Enforce the Restatement Approach Revive Haselden

While some jurisdictions, like Texas and Pennsylvania, have determined that
the reasonable amount of payment for medical services is the actual amount paid
to fully satisfy the medical bill,12 other jurisdictions, such as Hawaii and
Tennessee, have determined that the reasonable amount is the amount originally
billed. 18 3 Both approaches prevent the parties from submitting evidence contrary
to the prevailing view in the jurisdiction. 184 In Haselden, however, the court
specifically noted that both amounts were certainly helpful in determining the
reasonable value.185

180. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
181. See 5 STEVEN PITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D

§ 69.7

(3d ed. 2005) (citations

omitted).
182. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.2d 1149, 1162 (Haw. 2004) (quoting Pryor v. Webber,
263 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ohio 1970)) (holding that collateral payments should not be admitted into
evidence).
185. Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481, 484, 579 S.E.2d 293, 295 (2003) (citation omitted)
(citing Kashner v. Geisinger Clinic, 638 A.2d 980, 983 (Pa. 1994)) ("Among those factors to be
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Likewise, in Robinson v. Bates,18 6 the Supreme Court of Ohio determined
that the correct approach is to allow the jury to see both the amount billed and
the amount paid.
The Robinson court ruling that the collateral source rule
does not apply to write-offs in medical billing-reasoned that the fairest
approach is to hold the defendant res onsible for the reasonable value of the
medical costs the plaintiff incurred.
The court noted the difficulties in
determining what reasonablemeans due to the complexities of today's insurance
and reimbursement system and held that both the original medical bill and the
amount accepted as full payment were admissible. 189 Further, the court stated
that "[t]he jury may decide that the reasonable value of medical care is the
amount originally billed, the amount ... accepted as payment, or some amount
in between."1 90
Therefore, in keeping with the spirit of allowing a plaintiff to recover the
reasonable and necessary amounts of medical services rendered, it only makes
sense to allow jurors to view all helpful evidence that would assist them in
arriving at this value. More importantly, this approach places the burden on both
parties to convince the jurors of the actual fair and reasonable value. 191
Moreover, the collateral source rule prohibits defendants from introducing
evidence of a collateral benefit-a benefit conferred upon the plaintiff that is
wholly independent of the defendant.192 Some jurisdictions have argued that a
plaintiff should be entitled to the benefit of the bargain and have noted the
burden on taxpayers in cases in which the plaintiff is a Medicaid recipient.193
However, the rationale linking taxpayers to plaintiffs who receive Medicaid is
just as applicable to taxpaying defendants: If a defendant pays taxes and
contributes to the Medicaid system, should this not mean that the benefit is no
longer "wholly independent" of that person? Applying this logic, the collateral
source rule would not even be implicated. 194
In sum, if the goal is to allow the plaintiff to recover the reasonable and
necessary value of the medical costs incurred, it seems only logical to allow a
jury to view all available information and obtain the "big picture" of the health

considered by the jury are the amount billed to the plaintiff, and the relative market value of those
services.").
186. 857 N.E.2d 1195 (Ohio 2006).
187. Id. at 1200.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., id. (allowing the introduction of evidence of both the amount billed and the
amount paid, which left the determination of reasonableness in the hands of the jury after hearing
the parties' arguments on damages).
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 920A

cmt. b (1979).

193. See, e.g., Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 739 (N.C. 1987) (concluding that, "as
between defendants who tortiously inflict injury and innocent taxpayers who fund programs such as
Medicaid, we think it better that the loss fall on the tortfeasor").
194. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 920A

cmt. b (1979) (noting that the collateral

source rule requires that the benefit "not come from the defendant or a person acting for him").
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care industry's economic system. Allowing a jury to see both the full amount
and the amount actually paid would negate any opposing arguments involving
unjust enrichment or insufficient plaintiff compensation, as well as any
arguments against the creation of multiple classes of plaintiffs.
B. Statutory Exception
As previously discussed, some jurisdictions-such as Florida have created
specific statutory exceptions to the collateral source rule.195 These jurisdictions
have created exceptions as a mechanism to limit the rising costs of health
insurance, expensive litigation, and the hyperinflation of health care costs. 196
South Carolina would stand to benefit in the same ways as these jurisdictions.
Although courts in some jurisdictions have determined that it is improper to
allow the court system to create multiple classes of plaintiffs based on their
insurance coverage type, 197 this position lacks common sense. As the Howell
court explained, some element of fortuity regarding the pre-negotiation prices for
services exists among different health care providers, insurers, and the
uninsured.198 Furthermore, "identical injuries may have different economic
effects on different victims."l99 In Howell, the court opined that it should not
order one defendant to pay damages for a loss the plaintiff never incurred merely
because a different defendant may have to compensate a different plaintiff who
did suffer that loss in a completely separate matter. 200
Likewise, in Robinson, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that "[i]t may well
be that the collateral source rule itself is out of sync with today's economic
realities of managed care and insurance reimbursement for medical expenses."201
The Robinson court followed this description of the collateral source rule by then
seemingly encouraging the General Assembly of Ohio to craft legislation to
address this problem.
Creating a narrow statutory exception specifically tailored to the element of
compensatory damages in health care costs is certainly in line with the purpose
of compensatory damages, which is to put the injured party in the identical
position that the party was in prior to the wrongdoing. 20 In a marketplace in
which health care costs vary greatly for identical services, adhering to this

195. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West 2011).
196. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1162 (Haw. 2004) (explaining that creating
multiple categories of plaintiffs would improperly focus on the type of insurance coverage instead
of the nature of the injuries); Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (Ohio 2006) (declining to
adopt a categorical rule to avoid creating varying categories of plaintiffs).
198. See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1145 (Cal. 2011).
199. Id.
200. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3281, 3282 (West 1997)).
201. Robinson, 857 N.E.2d at 1201.
202. See id.
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §903 cmt. a (1979).
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purpose may be the only way to synthesize the true value without limiting the
value to the amount that was paid to fully satisfy the medical bill.
VI. CONCLUSION

When determining compensatory damages for health care costs, the
collateral source rule should not apply to limit a defendant from presenting
evidence of what a medical care provider actually received as full payment. In
the context of recent hyperinflation, as well as the complexities of the current
health care pricing and insurance reimbursement systems, the amount that a
health care provider coins as its full or list price is not the true indicator of the
value.204 To fulfill the goal of compensatory damages, South Carolina must
follow the spirit of the law and seek to place an injured party in the same
position that person was in before the wrong occurred not in a position that is
substantially greater.
Through reviving Haselden, South Carolina courts can better assist juries in
determining the reasonable value of medical services rendered. Allowing a jury
to view all available evidence will better empower the jury to arrive at a fair
value. Another alternative is for South Carolina to create a statutory exception to
the collateral source rule. This exception must address the fallacy that exists in
determining a health care provider's full price as the true value of medical
services rendered. Legislation creating an exception to the collateral source rule
would ensure that fairness is achieved in civil litigation, while helping control
the negative effects of hyperinflation of medical costs, rapid increases in
insurance premiums, and expensive litigation.
Todd R. Lyle

204. See Robinson, 857 N.E.2d at 1200; Nation, supra note 109, at 104.
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